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This essay surveys the changing role of fraud (dishonest and immoral commercial 
practices) in public justifications for corporate management of overseas trade in 
England across the seventeenth century. It argues that the perceived likelihood of 
fraud in international commercial settings played a critical role in public 
justifications for trading corporations at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century. The essay suggests that these justifications were challenged from the 
1690s. The essay explores three aspects of this challenge: first, the ways in which 
agents of the East India Company convinced the Company to liberate private 
trade (an activity previously defined as fraudulent by the Company and the 
Courts); second, the arguments from the 1680s that depicted the joint-stock 
corporation as an unaccountable, soulless entity whose claim to public trust 
looked less credible; third, how decades of accumulated experience of 
international trading contexts (and interactions with non-European merchants) 
prompted pamphleteers to promote the possibility (and reality) of unregulated 
trade in those settings. All three helped to erode the former association between 
private individual trade in international contexts as likely to encourage 
dishonesty, immorality, and fraud. This change therefore led to the corporate 
body itself becoming a possible vehicle for fraud rather than the individual 
international merchant (who the corporation was meant originally to regulate). 
The paper analyses public deliberations about fraud and corporations to make 
interventions in the history of economic thought, the history of trading 
companies, and the history of economic crime (and especially its rhetorical role in 
debates about the regulation of trade). 
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In his opening speech at the trial of Warren Hastings (1732-1818), the former Governor 
General of Bengal in 1788, Edmund Burke (1729-1797) argued that the English East 
India Company’s corporate structure and culture – what Burke labelled as its ‘espirit de 
corps’ – encouraged the Company to operate in India in ways that prompted legitimate 
charges of ‘bribery, corruption, or malversation.’ Burke went on to argue of ‘the 
corporate spirit’ [that it]…never was a spirit which corrected itself in any time or 
circumstance in the world.’ Overseas trading corporations like the East India Company 
were, as far as Burke was concerned, unaccountable to social, moral, and legal 
prescriptions; they were structurally predisposed to permit and protect dishonesty 
amongst their members and officials.i Although it was Hastings in the dock, Burke 
(somewhat paradoxically) attributed some of the responsibility for Hastings’ alleged 
crimes to the corporate context in which he operated. For Burke, the ways in which the 
East India Company’s ‘corporate spirit’ subsumed individual action and eroded and 
obscured individual responsibility were profoundly unsettling.ii  
 
A century and a half earlier, however, when corporations had emerged as the default 
English means to organise trading relationships beyond Europe, corporations were 
promoted precisely because they subsumed individual action and eroded individual 
responsibility. Instead of correcting their own malversation (as Burke expected) at the 
corporate, institutional level, corporations, for seventeenth century promoters like 
Edward Misselden and Henry Parker, provided internal governance that corrected what 
they regarded as the individual’s inherent propensity to commit fraud.iii For much of the 
seventeenth century, corporations were seen as the state’s and the public’s only defense 
against the presumed dishonesty that ungoverned individuals – Europeans and non-
Europeans – would exhibit in commercial arenas beyond Europe. By the eighteenth 
century, however, the individual (European and non-European) trader’s private, 
acquisitive interests would be lauded as socially beneficial and the corporation itself 
would instead be depicted as an institutional vehicle for commercial deceit and 
dishonesty.iv 
 
This article surveys the changing place and depiction of fraud within public justifications 
for corporate management of international trade across the seventeenth century. It 
suggests that public concern about corporate fraud emanated in the 1680s from a slowly-
emerging unease about the agency of soulless corporate forms which helped – alongside 
embryonic arguments about the rationality of individual economic actors – to 
reformulate the ungoverned individual as responsible and virtuous (rather than inherently 
deceitful). The article connects public debates about the place of corporations in 
governing international trade with contrasting attempts within corporations to first 
restrict the economic license of their members overseas and then accommodate that 
license in ways that advanced the commercial interests of the corporate whole. It 
explores and analyses the points at which attitudes to international commercial contexts 
were reformulated to permit individual commercial license to satisfy the public good.  
 
Seventeenth century trading corporations provide a distinctive and important perspective 
for historians of economic crime. As early-modern entities, they transgress the traditional 
distinctions that often exist in the literature about economic criminality: between the 
public and private, between political and economic, between the market and the state, 
the domestic and international, and between sovereignty and dependence.v Seventeenth 
century trading corporations were special constitutional cases that blurred the (still-
evolving) boundaries of commercial criminality. They operated with important 
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constitutional privileges. They bent the law to advance their commercial interests. The 
East India Company, for example, was chartered to facilitate the export of bullion – a 
crime for non-incorporated entities. This privilege became a persistent source of public 
anger and opposition. Corporations also sometimes enjoyed tax breaks and exemption 
from bankruptcy legislation; they benefitted from a separate legal personality and 
therefore could not make oaths, could not appear in court, could not commit a crime. 
Trading corporations also authored economic impropriety: with their own vice-admiralty 
courts, which did not use juries and against which there was no appeal – the corporations 
could set the rules to suit their commercial needs.vi During the seventeenth century, 
corporations exhibited the full range of economic immorality: insider dealing, financial 
malpractice, defrauding of investors (stock jobbing), tax fraud, engrossment – price 
fixing, bribery, and corruption of elections and the political process.vii This article, 
however, focusses on a broader and often rhetorical notion of commercial immorality 
that the corporation set itself up against – the tendency for the international commercial 
environments that these corporate entities operated in to encourage and facilitate 
dishonest and deceitful commercial practices.  
 
This article proposes the following four interventions in the broader research field of 
‘white collar crime’.viii First, the essay takes the narrative of white-collar crime back to an 
earlier and neglected setting – the seventeenth century.ix Seventeenth century England 
offers a distinctive context in which to examine the history of ‘white collar crime’. In 
particular, it allows us the opportunity to appreciate how such impropriety derived from 
legal ambiguity and uncertainty because the seventeenth century was a period of 
innovation for corporations and because the corporations were themselves 
constitutionally contentious. Although there may have been ambiguity in the law, there 
was little moral ambiguity about fraud.x The seventeenth century also offers us the 
opportunity to investigate how the altered depiction for fraudulent activity – from the 
individual to the corporate levels - intersected with a period of impressive commercial 
growth overseas. Second, the article’s exploration of the public debates and legal disputes 
about international trading corporations – as institutions that were both private and 
public – offers another case study examining the potential social harm caused by the 
intersection of private capital and government interests.xi Third, the article’s analysis of 
international commercial settings demonstrates how these settings could spur innovation, 
which challenged commercial regulations where they were often – in any case – difficult 
to enforce.xii These settings also encouraged commercial offenders to justify their actions 
with reference to their local context. Rather than offending due to ‘low self control’ these 
individuals justified their rule breaking with reference to the commercial realities of their 
environments.xiii Fourth, in the seventeenth century, the commercial opportunities of 
malfeasance in new commercial contexts overseas could produce benefits for the 
corporation and the individuals employed by it in ways that came to explain new 
behaviours and, ultimately, new social norms that would come to be supported by 
amoral economic precepts. As such, this article reverses the traditional formulation 
depicting personal norms protecting the environment by showing how new commercial 
environments compelled malfeasant behaviour that would then be rationalised as new 
personal and social norms.xiv 
 
This article also uses its focus on the relationship between fraud – broadly conceived – 
and public debates about the need for corporate governance in international settings – to 
connect writing on the history of the public sphere, economic thought, corporate history, 
and the history of global, cross-cultural interactions. The article examines fraud as a 
broad (and sometimes rhetorical) category within important public debates rather than 
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solely as a crime (the breaking of a public law). The altered role for fraud within 
justifications for corporate management of international trade emerged at a time when 
the abstract notion of the public and political potency of public opinion gathered 
traction.xv This article locates the discussion of fraud  - deceit in a commercial context – 
into public debates about corporations and therefore into emerging debates about 
political economy and economic thought.xvi In these debates, fraud is often a species of 
vice (that is straightforward immorality) and as vice was playfully reimagined as socially 
beneficial by the beginning of the eighteenth century, so individual economic license lost 
its inherent connection with deceit and became more often a public good.xvii In this 
sense, the article proposes to set the reformatted role of fraud across the seventeenth 
century into justifications for trade regulation alongside equivalent examinations of the 
importance of monopolies and of civic corporate culture in the debates about the 
importance of trading corporations.xviii The article also argues that careful focus on the 
changed role of fraud in public debates about corporations helps historians to connect 
the altered depictions of non-European peoples to concurrent alterations in political 
economy. In this way, the article contributes to the literature about cross-cultural 




Across the period surveyed in this article, the meaning of fraud changed from a 
generalised notion of deceit (in commercial and religious contexts) to a deliberate act of 
criminal deception. Throughout the seventeenth century, writers juxtaposed fraud with 
force as the antonyms of the humanist outlook inverting honesty and intellect 
respectively. The appearance, in 1678, of the Statute of Frauds, which required written 
memoranda to grant validity to contracts, produced a new association with 
documentation.xx Of course, in the public (and often printed) deliberations that this 
article focusses on, writers used terms like fraud and crime interchangeably. For Edward 
Misselden, the price-fixing practices associated with monopolistic trading corporations 
operating within Europe (like the Merchant Adventurers) were described as ‘crimes’.xxi 
But Misselden’s (and countless other writers’) usage is broader here. Such practices 
(along with engrossment) were deemed to be immoral rather than criminal. Indeed, 
trading corporations existed as self-governing bodies permitted to practice what society 
had long depicted as against the public interest – including, in the East India Company’s 
case, the export of bullion. Their privileges provided new codes that would redefine 
previously immoral behaviour as socially beneficial. Depictions of fraud prior to the 
development of a rigorous criminal code for international transactions (and often relating 
to far flung commercial contexts where that code had limited applicability) were 
therefore highly partial. Fraud signified commercial deceit that resulted from deviating 
from acceptable economic actions and motives. It meant dishonestly undermining the 
public good. It included contravening written and oral obligations (charters and oaths) to 
promote private gain. Similarly, the pamphlet disputes that generated much of the source 
material for this article, of course, produced polarised and self-interested positions. But 
the careful reading and contextualisation of these sources offered here can nonetheless 
help us to discern general shifts in the conceptual relationships between broad rhetorical 
categories like ‘fraud’ and ‘governance’ in trade. 
 
Commercial fraud appears to have had an instrumental connection with non-European 
commercial contexts and peoples. Public unease about deceit therefore grew with the 
expansion of overseas trade beyond Europe. Nationalist stereotypes of commercial 
probity emerged from this unease. In the preface to his 1599 Principal Navigations, 
6 
 
geographer Richard Hakluyt (1552-1616) abstracted some of the stories from his 
anthology and highlighted the strangeness of foreign practices by characterising them as 
a form of deviance and more than that – fraud. Similarly, Hakluyt famously used his 
anthology of English travels to reify an English protestant character that was beyond 
moral reproach and therefore well positioned to assume control over the global terrains 
the work surveys.xxii These concerns about the ways in which international trade could 
pollute the honest English character were compounded by the prevalent civic humanist 
view that unrestrained trade gave license to socially corrosive greed that would often be 
advanced through fraudulent means. The pamphleteer and currency expert Gerard de 
Malynes (1586-1641) expressed a broadly-held view in 1622 during a debate about the 
causes of the depletion of England’s bullion (a debate which placed the East India 
Company centre stage) when he advised that being ‘without fraud and deceit’ were the 
principle characteristics required for any international merchant – a prioritisation that 
indicated much about society’s pessimism about the mercantile class at this time. To 
ensure that merchants operated with integrity and in the public good Malynes advised 
that government (the epitome of which was – in a commercial context – the corporation) 
was required to ensure that the individual interests of merchants would not be permitted 
to challenge the public good. If individualism was the nemesis of the public interest, then 
fraud and deceit (for Malynes usually listed together) were the distillates of commercial 
individualism unrestrained by the unique and pervasive form of mercantile 
governmentality – the corporation. Again, the association of fraud and unregulated trade 
was strengthened in the international arena. Malynes had long been concerned about 
what he viewed as the inherently fraudulent tendencies of international currency dealers. 
He also worried in particular about the merchant’s ability to ‘trafficke with Turkes, 
Heathens, Barbarians, and Infidels, and performe promise with them’ and whether the 
difficulties of dealing truthfully with non-Christians might enervate the lone merchant’s 
already-pronounced tendency to defraud.xxiii 
 
The trading corporation was promoted as the best method for guarding against the 
disorderly and immoral tendencies of the commercial world beyond Christendom 
(amongst Christians and non-Christians). A supporter of the East India Company, Henry 
Parker (1604-1652) had stressed in 1648 that trading corporations were well placed to 
order commerce: ‘as we are a Corporation, we are armed thereby with a competence of 
power to inforce, & execute our Orders so made, and if any violence of forrein States, 
and Potentates contrary to our Intercourses, and Treaties of amitie enterposes to our 
prejudice, or if any new Tolls, imposts, or exactions oppresse us, we are in this posture 
better qualified to relieve, or vindicate our selves, then else we should be.’xxiv As 
monopolies, the pamphleteers who supported the trading companies regularly proposed 
that those who wished to dismantle monopoly were entirely self-seeking and that 
ungoverned, non-corporate trade would defraud the public.xxv Parker described how 
corporations of all kinds boasted internal bye-laws that could be relied upon to prevent 
members from responding to new economic circumstances with new species of fraud:  
 
‘as we injoy many conveniencies by being an united, imbodied Fraternity, so by 
vertue of the same we are guarded and protected from many inconveniences. As 
we have a jurisdiction amongst us, we are inabled upon all new emergencies to 
contravene new devised arts of fraud, and circumvention in bargaining, selling, 
&c. by making new Orders against them.’xxvi 
  
But this was wishful thinking on Parker’s part. The trading corporation’s principal 
institutional challenge was altering an organisation of local government – the municipal 
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corporation (combining some of the civic cultures of the livery company in the process) - 
into an organisation designed to govern transnationally. This made the issue of moral 
hazard – that is preventing overseas officials from defrauding the corporate centre – 
trading corporation’s defining problem. The large marketplaces that factors and officials 
of the trading corporations found themselves in – places like Surat and Ouidah – 
presented substantial commercial opportunities for employees of the companies as well 
as independent, interloping merchants. Because of their monopolies, the companies 
depicted these opportunities as malfeasant. Companies used oaths to bind their 
employees’ honesty, they resorted to quasi-legal vice-admiralty courts to intimidate 
interlopers, they often deployed state power to enforce their monopolies – in the form of 
the Royal Navy. But none of them succeeded in restraining the individual license of their 
employees for very long. 
 
Economists and business historians have long focused on the difficulties of controlling 
overseas corporate actors. For contemporaries and later-theorists, the difficulties of 
solving this problem proved both fatal and definitive for trading corporations. An 
investor in the Royal African Company, Nicholas Morice (1681-1726), explained the 
company’s downfall with reference to the difficulties of extending standards of 
commercial probity across long distances: ‘the frauds and cheats of their factors … [and] 
that the planters in the several lands of America were men without justice and common 
honesty.’xxvii This view was made more famous by Adam Smith who argued that the 
companies’ structure generated mismanagement and allowed ‘negligence, profusion and 
malversion of their own servants’ which the companies were unable to control.xxviii One 
company, however, was able to respond to the private commercial instincts of its 
overseas agents by redefining fraud as commercial opportunity and therefore aligning the 
interests of the corporate whole with its membership. This was the East India Company. 
This recasting of fraud formed a part of a broader shift in the relationship between the 
prospect of fraud in international settings and the justification for governance of 
overseas trade.  
 
Initially, the East India Company imposed strict restrictions on its agents’ freedom to 
trade on their own private accounts. Sociologist Emily Erikson has explored the ways in 
which the company learnt over the course of decades to gradually permit private trade. 
In 1661, the company officially withdrew from the country trade – trade between Asian 
ports (rather than between Europe and Asia) – and allowed agents to occupy that 
commercial space. In 1667, trade in certain commodities was opened up between Europe 
and Asia (excepting pepper and calico).xxixAs Erikson makes clear, the allowing of private 
trade simply legitimized existing practice.xxx What is less clear is how the Company 
computed the corporate benefits of permitting private trade. 
 
Earlier attempts by the Company to prosecute those who had allegedly defrauded it 
overseas prompted court room arguments that clarified how the individual, private 
interests of Company agents could simultaneously uphold those of the corporate whole.  
In 1673, William Blake, a former factor of the Company, brought a bill against the 
Company to the Court of Chancery requesting to be relieved against a Company 
accusation of breach of contract (act of covenant) for £26,000, which he owed because 
he had traded in prohibited goods on his own account beyond the limits specified in the 
Company’s contract with him. Since 1657, the Company had insisted on having its agents 
sign contracts that specified fines according to the scale of private trade. The Company 
sued Blake according to the terms of one of these agreements. His testimony reveals the 
view among representatives of the Company in India that such regulations represented 
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‘only a Thing of Course, and to restrain their Factors from excessive Trading in 
prohibited Commodities; and that the Penalties were never exacted or taken in Specie, 
nor insisted on farther than to satisfy the Company the real Damage they might sustain 
by such private Trade.’ Blake went on to offer a clear vision of the ways in which private 
trade facilitated the trade of the Company and how each would be instrumental in 
furthering the other’s interests. He mentioned how it had been ‘intimated to him’ that 
 
‘if he should find a good Bargain… of any prohibited Goods, and should have 
nothing in his Hands of the Said Company to deal for it, …it would be a good 
Service to them to lay out his own Money for such a Bargain, so as he would let 
the Company have it again at a moderate Rate, and would export no such Goods 
into Europe but on the Company’s Account’. 
 
Blake went on to describe such a scenario and the consequences for the Company of 
him not using his initiative. In particular, Blake stressed how the on-the-spot initiative of 
individuals like him facilitated the Company’s corporate trade: 
 
‘If he had not purchased them with his own Money the Company could never have 
them, because the Dutch and other Merchants would have contracted for them; so 
that when the Ships of the Company should come to India there would have been 
no Freight for them; and he let the Company have these Goods at an easier Rate 
than they could have bought them, and never charged them for more than the 
Price current at the Port Towns where he placed them ready to freight the 
Company’s Ships when they should arrive.’ 
 
The Company responded by noting the ‘many secret Opportunities’ the factors had ‘to 
abuse the company’ by placing their interests above the Company’s when transacting in 
India and how due to the distances involved and the ways in which the factors ‘by 
Agreement among themselves’ concealed such practices, the Company was unable to 
prosecute the deceitful. Ironically, the Company identified the corporate solidarity 
amongst its overseas factors as a structural cause for the defrauding of the corporate 
whole. Ultimately the Lord Keeper concluded that the Company ought to be able to 
enforce this covenant because ‘there could be no other way for the Company to restrain 
them, the Consequence whereof in Time might be the Loss of all the English trade in 
India.’ Within six years of the Blake case, however, the Company resolved to abandon 
these restrictions on the private trade in prohibited goods. Although the direct 
connections are not recorded, it is clear that Blake’s version of the English India 
Company’s trade in India proved more durable than the Lord Keeper’s.xxxi  
 
Blake’s case demonstrates the emerging importance of recasting the frauds of members 
as individual license that would provide the corporate whole with better market 
information and responsiveness and a more durable trade. Fraud would need to be co-
opted by the corporate whole – precisely as William Blake advised – to ensure the 
corporation could endure and the East India Company’s middle ground of permitting 
private trade within a corporate framework proved successful. The commercial success 
of the East India Company in the 1680s endorsed this new model of a corporation that 
thrived on the private interests of its membership. Although the connection was not 
made explicitly, the perceived triumph of individual license within formerly monopolistic, 
corporate contexts overseas aided the cause of those who wished to promote deregulated 






England’s participation in international trade grew markedly from the 1660s onwards. 
The value of overseas trade almost doubled from £7.9 million in the 1660s to £14.5 
million by the 1720s. Most of this growth derived from enlarged trade in commodities 
from America and Asia and the increase in the variety of export goods. Trade in 
plantation commodities such as tobacco, sugar and Indian cotton increased as a 
proportion of all imports from 7 per cent in 1621 to 34 percent in 1701.xxxii This 
international commercial expansion interacted in complex ways with concurrent changes 
in English government. Parliament had begun to limit the monarch’s right to govern 
international trade unilaterally from the 1640s. The restoration of the monarchy had 
brought restored dynamism to the constitutional association between royal government 
and economic growth. From the 1690s, however, the primacy of Parliament as supreme 
regulator of the English economy became undisputed. Although the trading corporation 
was the institutional spearhead for much of the commercial expansion, as overseas trade 
expanded so too did the number of private merchants plying trades with markets beyond 
Europe. As the century continued, pamphleteers and the public came to understand that 
the increased scale of England’s international trade disabused earlier suspicions about the 
exclusively dishonest motivations and practices of merchants trading overseas. 
 
Within a decade of the East India Company co-opting the frauds of its overseas agents 
into its business, the Company became the target for opponents who alleged that its 
corporate structure was responsible for dishonest and immoral commercial practices. 
The argument to promote the individual over the corporate person was not made on 
solely economic grounds. While private trade increased in Asia, public debates depicted 
the East India Company’s domestic operation as increasingly closed to non-members, 
overpowerful, and satisfying the narrow commercial interests of a corporate elite. Instead 
domestic disquiet about the corporate form appeared in the 1680s as part of a broader 
reaction against ‘soulless’ joint stock corporations who could not be trusted to honour 
debts. Dealing with such bodies was, for the opponent of the East India Company and 
lawyer, Henry Pollexfen (1632-1691) akin to ‘dealing with Spirits, an Invisible Body 
subsisting only in intelligentia legis’.xxxiii Opponents of the corporate (and especially joint-
stock) form pre-empted Burke’s argument about the corporation’s lack of accountability 
by comparing the ‘unnatural’ corporate entity with the ‘natural’ individual – an entity that 
was (unlike the joint stock company) subject to external judgement and could therefore 
be more easily kept within society’s moral and legal guidelines. ‘[W]hen we are to 
accompt with single Persons, or with Persons Incorporated with a Soul (that is, with no 
Joint-Stock)’, explained one anonymous opponent of the East India Company  neither 
Plantiff nor the Defendant must be their own Judges’. According to this form of 
opposition, corporations were subject to no other authority than their own and their 
corporate structure and culture privileged this introspective responsibility over the 
broader, public good. As another anti-company pamphlet alleged that ‘the Members 
cannot be Free to do any thing that may lessen the Gain of the Joint-Stock, tho' the 
publick Good should require it’.xxxiv Corporations were therefore increasingly understood 
to be creating private allegiances that contradicted their earlier public role. 
 
These arguments about the dubious public credentials of the corporations rubbed 
shoulders in public in the 1690s with a growing surge of anti-corporate writing that 
alleged various species of corporate immorality. Pamphleteers objected to the ways in 
which the Company had allowed its directors to behave in deceitful (but not illegal) ways: 
conducting closed sales of goods, practicing insider trading, and supplying the Company 
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on favourable terms.xxxv Evidence of stock market manipulation picked up on by 
pamphleteers like Daniel Defoe saw the corporation itself depicted increasingly as the 
agent of fraud. The state intervened to reset the public mission of the corporations 
through legislation banning insider trading (by insisting, for example, that sales of 
company goods took place in public and ‘by inch of candle’) and reforming voting 
regulations to prevent a small cabal of shareholders had engrossed control over the 
company.xxxvi To prevent ‘Fraud and Deceit’ the directors of the East India Company 
volunteered to introduce greater transparency to their internal dealings within the 
company by publicly declaring all private dealings with the Company.xxxvii In 1698, the 
Royal African Company’s power was circumscribed through a partial deregulation of its 
monopoly and a ban on its members sitting on colonial councils.xxxviii This reform 
addressed Pollexfen’s concerns about the ways in which the corporations’ judicial power 
could limit their public accountability overseas. East India Company officials involved in 
bribing the Speaker of the House of Commons were also severely reprimanded. These 
changes amounted to a Parliamentary compliance revolution to attempted to bring what 
were increasingly depicted as private corporations to the heel – once again - of the public 
good. 
 
The traditional view of non-Europeans as inherently dishonest would, however, prove 
durable in public debates. Charles Davenant, a public promoter of the East India and 
Royal African Company’s monopolies described the West African suppliers of the 
African Company in 1709 as ‘a very cunning, as well as deceitful people’.xxxix Instead, 
commercial deceit would emerge less from intrinsic cultural (or even racial) 
characteristics and would be depicted as something emanating from free market 
circumstances. In a letter to the company’s Leadenhall Street Directorate, an African 
Company official at Cape Coast Castle, John Chaigneau, described the deregulation as 
favoring the Africans and depicted them in ways that the Company had often portrayed 
individual, private traders: “No people in the world (I believe) understand their interest 
better than the Blacks of the Gold-Coast.” Another added, “They are Selfish and 
Perfidious to the last degree; and having no sence of Honour, or Religion to controle 
them, No contracts or promises on their Parts will Bind them.” The Company began to 
attribute the commercial success of the independent traders to their willingness to 
encourage the “truckling” of African vendors. One African Company official compared 
the private traders’ commercial attributes to a latent but vicious tropical disease that 
would remain dormant until activated by the germ of unregulated human trafficking: 
“The Fantyns are taught to trade [by the individual traders], and by Experience are 
Expert Merchants, if such a Term may be given to Cunning Tricking Villains, who now 
give the Law to their instructors, and make them meanly and basely truckle to them for 
every Thing.”xl For promoters of companies, the corporate form would continue to 
provide the innoculation for this disease. 
 
By the 1690s, however, more sympathetic depictions of non-Europeans merchants began 
to appear in public. They emanated from both pro and anti-corporate interests. Some 
therefore argued for corporate management on the grounds that free trade encouraged 
immorality that would harm rather than favour non-Europeans. According to one 
pamphleteer non-European contexts led honest English merchants into deceitful and 
immoral practices. In 1690, a “Gentleman in the City” alleged that an unregulated 
African trade would descend into an orgy of economic crime: 
 
‘For as Traders at random, do seldom propose any thing, besides and beyond their 
private ends, so it is easie to be imagined, on what Insolences, Frauds and Rapines, 
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scattered and particular Men will venture, upon the hope and prospect of enriching 
themselves, when there is no Common and Established Society accountable for 
the miscarriage of every individual.’ 
 
Directly contradicting those who had sought to suggest that an individual with a soul was 
more trustworthy than a joint-stock ‘spirit’, for ‘the Gentleman’ only a state-sponsored 
monopoly company could uphold “Humanity, Truth, and Justice.”xli  
 
Opponents of corporate organization of overseas trade began – for the first time - to 
contest the trading companies’ view that unregulated overseas trade was a slippery slope 
to fraud. Public debates about corporations publicised a century of mercantile experience 
of non-European commerce and therefore challenged the long-held view that 
international contexts encouraged deceitful and immoral commercial practices. As a 
result, corporations began to style a new kind of relationships for themselves with the 
non-European peoples they proclaimed had often been designed – from their inception 
– to ‘bridle and awe’.xlii Pamphleteers who sought to deregulate the slave trade proposed 
that African slave vendors were civilised and that their slave entrepots, like Ouidah, 
resembled the civilised commercial centres of Europe, such as Livorno. Similarly, the 
Levant Company lobbyists who wished to reform the corporate governance of the 
closed East India Company had to argue that the Mughal Empire was as sophisticated a 
place as the Ottoman Empire.xliii These opponents of corporations argued that rather 
than being barbarous despots, as the corporations often depicted non-Europeans, the 
commercial contacts within the Hudson’s Bay Company (to take just one example) were 
timorous and corporate power was therefore excessive.xliv Opponents of the East India 
Company began to suggest in the 1690s that the price-fixing power that the Company’s 
monopoly was supposed to confer on the Company in Asia was immoral: 
 
our English Merchants who understand it to be the Interest of the Nation to 
enlarge the Trades of it, yet their Interest, especially those which trade by 
excluding the rest of the Nation, is to continue the Trades of England, as they 
now stand; for thereby they take off the Manufactures of the poor Natives at 
what prizes they please, and no more then they please, whereby the Artificers in 
them, are not only reduced to Poverty in Working, but cannot be further 
imployed than these Merchants please: And also impose what prizes they please 
upon the Natives in their Returns.xlv  
 
The received precepts of mercantilist management  - that trade ought to be managed in 
ways that minimised the possibility of commercial gain for non-European peoples (as 
well as for Europeans trading on their own accounts) became challenged. What had been 
a pillar of mercantilist doctrine for much of the seventeenth century – the concentration 
of economic power through monopolies to control prices overseas and limit the 
commercial gain of the ‘heathen’ began to be subject to new (and  - in this period – 
occasional) challenge by the slow realisation that during international trading 
relationships were built upon the prospect of mutual business advantage across cultures. 
Decades of accumulated commercial experience of non-European commercial contexts 
made members of trading corporation’s attempts to defend their privileges with 
references to seductive but supposedly disorderly commercial wildernesses less likely to 
succeed. 
 
This recasting of non-European commercial morality was part of a slow but sure 
reinvention of the economic meaning of fraud that began to alter corporate relationships 
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with non-European peoples and operated alongside theoretical alterations to the 
meaning of fraud that were led, most notoriously, by Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733), 
who would push the argument that private vices produced public virtue in his 1705 
poem, The Grumbling Hive and later in the Fable of the Bees (1714). As the corporations had 
themselves learned to permit the private trading initiatives of their overseas agents and as 
depictions of the commercial instincts of non-Europeans (and non European 
commercial environments) became slowly more positive, individual license became a 
more solid foundation on which to base an economy. For independent traders, 
deregulated international trade produced national economic and military benefits because 
it transferred responsibility for trade away from government and to “those animal Spirits, 
those Springs of Riches which have enabled us to spend 100 Millions for the sake of our 
Liberties, in a long and bloody War.”xlvi With the willingness to accommodate individual 
interests at home and abroad, in corporate and non-corporate trades, came challenges to 
the view that non-European commercial contacts were inherently deceitful and 
fraudulent in their practices. Set alongside the emerging view that corporations’ soulless, 
impersonal structure lessened their public accountability, these alterations to public 
attitudes to private individual economic activity helped to make it possible to shift the 




The liability of individuals within corporations, of course, remained strong. Even the 
notorious financial scandals of the early eighteenth centuries would single out a new 
group – stockjobbers – as the perpetrators of fraud rather than blaming the corporate 
body itself and the directors of the South Sea Company were more often blamed for the 
South Sea Bubble than the corporate form itself.xlvii Because a connection had been made 
in public between individual economic license and improved commercial performance in 
various trades, the arguments in favour of the corporate organisation of international 
trade made less reference to success in business. Instead, from the 1740s, corporations 
returned to arguments about accountability and, increasingly, to the need to project a 
moral front to non-Europeans that contrasted with the (now) amoral (rather than 
fraudulent) free market of individual merchants. ‘Incorporation’ became a word used to 
characterise a mutually beneficial commercial alliance between Europeans and non-
Europeans. Subject to a further round of parliamentary enquiries in the 1740s, the 
Hudson Bay and Royal African Companies both depicted themselves as the friend of the 
non-European. In the case of the Hudson Bay Company, their apologist Thomas White 
insisted that the ‘Indians were always well used and kindly entertained...’ by the 
Company.xlviii Similarly, the Royal African Company promoted its chartered structure 
with reference to the hospitality it showed to Africans and the opportunities its African 
network of forts provided for establishing a ‘legitimate commerce’ with Africa that did 
not involve the slave trade.xlix The Royal African Company suggested that it could be 
trusted to right moral wrongs overseas because: ‘they are considered as a corporate Body, 
to which Application may be always made, and who are at all Times answerable to the 
several Negroe Governments upon the Coast for the Conduct and Behaviour of the 
British Nation.’l In these rather isolated accounts, the corporate form had mutated from 
a faceless, soulless, ‘spirit’ at home to the embodiment of accountability overseas. The 
Royal African Company’s arguments were not successful. Within two years its joint stock 
had been wound up. Rapidly expanding deregulated trades to Africa, the Levant, and 
elsewhere in North America made it more difficult to promote corporations on 
economic grounds – a difficulty that no doubt encouraged Burke’s bold indictment of 




So although corporations continued to promote their own privileges and provoke 
opposition, the contours of the debate about corporate management of overseas trade 
shifted across the seventeenth century – pivoting on the parliamentary debates of the 
1690s. The role of fraud altered drastically across the century. Corporations ceased to be 
bastions against fraud and became  - for the first time – possible perpetrators of fraud. 
Individuals operating in international commercial contexts ceased – correspondingly – to 
be always depicted as inherently dishonest and became increasingly styled as 
economically rational and therefore determinative of national economic success and 
supportive of the public good. The possible role of fraud within debates about corporate 
management of international trade changed from the deceit of the public by individuals 
to the deceit of individuals by corporations – from an individual to an institutional 
phenomenon.  
 
This exploration of the changing public attitudes towards individual economic 
opportunity – and the ways that change reconceptualised the place of dishonesty and 
immorality in justifications for corporate trade regulation – has demonstrated how an 
institution designed to prevent (what its apologists believed to be) the worst fraudulent 
instincts of the private individual – the international commercial corporation – came to 
depend on liberating those instincts. The East India Company, to take the most 
important example, changed because it shifted forms from being a command-and-
control body which sought to funnel all economic gain through its London account 
books into a more complex, flexible, and evasive entity that learnt to co-opt the more 
socially legitimate economic instincts of its overseas agents and their non-European 
trading partners. Private, economic liberty, in this sense, was not a norm diffused from 
Europe to (what contemporaries often depicted as the) barbaric cultures beyond, but was 
more likely infused from the cross-cultural dialogue structured by trading corporations 
across national boundaries. This exploratory history of the seventeenth century 
connections between perceptions and depictions of dishonest and immoral commercial 
behaviour and justifications for corporate management of international trade therefore 
offers historians the means to connect international contexts to changes in corporate 
governance, alterations to economic theory, and the modified place of a rhetorical 
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